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NOTE
Help Me, Help You: Eighth Circuit
Diminishes Notice Requirement for
Employees Seeking an ADA Accommodation
Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2016)

Rachel S. Kim*

I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of Title I of the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) is
to remove barriers individuals with disabilities face in the workplace.1 In addition to prohibiting employers from discriminating against individuals with
disabilities, the ADA also mandates an affirmative duty on employers to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees who need assistance
in performing their jobs.2 Employers and employees share the responsibility
of identifying an accommodation; they should work together through what is
called an “interactive process” to find an accommodation that assists the employee in successfully performing his or her job and does not place an undue
burden on the employer.3
The ADA statute,4 legislative history,5 Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) guidance,6 and Eighth Circuit precedent7 indicate that
an employee seeking an accommodation must first request his or her need for
an accommodation before the employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process is triggered. The Eighth Circuit, however, has not consistently held a uni-

*

B.A., University of Missouri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2018; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018. Thank you to Professor Rafael Gely for his helpful edits and thoughtful advice, to the editors of the Missouri Law Review, especially Abigail Williams for not only her support in preparing
this Note but for encouraging me to join the Missouri Law Review. I am also grateful
to my family and friends for their unwavering support.
1. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
2. Id. § 12112(b).
3. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2017).
4. Id. § 1630.2.
5. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 65 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
348.
6. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2017).
7. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 8

410

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

form rule regarding what information an employer must have before it is obligated to engage in the interactive process.8 In some cases, the Eighth Circuit
has strictly required employees to clearly request an accommodation before
any duty of the employer is triggered.9 In other cases, the Eighth Circuit has
held as long as the employee provided enough information, combined with
what the employer already knew about the employee’s limitations, the employer is sufficiently put on notice for the need for an accommodation.10 The
Eighth Circuit took the latter approach in Kowitz v. Trinity Health.11
This Note argues that the Eighth Circuit’s holding creates uncertainty for
both employers and employees. When deciding whether an employer has
failed to engage in the interactive process, the Eighth Circuit should look to
whether the employee clearly requested a need for an accommodation, rather
than examining the totality of knowledge the employer had on hand. Requiring
employees to clearly request an accommodation puts employers on notice and
thus helps employers better help employees with disabilities. Part II of this
Note provides the facts and holding of Kowitz. Part III examines the legal
background surrounding Kowitz. Part IV reviews the instant decision of the
court. Part V explains why employees should be required to clearly request a
desire for an accommodation, as well as provides guidance for employers moving forward. Part VI concludes this Note.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In March of 2007, Roberta Kowitz began employment at Trinity Health.12
Trinity Health is a non-profit, integrated healthcare system that provides a variety of healthcare services to people in North Dakota and surrounding areas.13
Kowitz was initially hired as a respiratory therapist in the cardiopulmonary
department but later assumed duties as a lead technician in the blood gas laboratory.14 Her direct supervisor was Douglas Reinertson, and Reinertson’s direct
supervisor was Mark Waldera.15
Kowitz suffered from cervical spinal stenosis, a degenerative disease of
the spine.16 This spinal disease required her to have corrective neck surgery.17

8. Craig A. Sullivan, The ADA’s Interactive Process, 57 J. Mo. B. 116, 118–19

(2001).
9. See Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Mole
v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1999).
10. Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1999).
11. Kowitz, 839 F.3d 742.
12. Id. at 744.
13. About Trinity Health, TRINITY HEALTH, http://trinityhealth.org/about (last visited May 29, 2018).
14. Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 744.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Kowitz requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act18 (“FMLA”)
from July 27, 2010, through September 10, 2010.19 Trinity Health granted her
request.20 On September 7, 2010, Kowitz’s physician recommended she not
return to work until October 18, 2010.21 Kowitz thus requested an extension
of leave through October 19, 2010.22 Trinity granted the extension.23 With the
extension, Kowitz had exhausted the remainder of her FMLA leave.24
When Kowitz returned to work, she provided Trinity with a Return to
Work Form, outlining her physical limitations.25 In addition, she told Reinertson that she would be unable to work full twelve-hour shifts until approved to
do so by her physician.26 Reinertson assigned Kowitz to work eight-hour shifts
instead but told her that Trinity would not be able to reduce her shifts indefinitely.27
On November 19, 2010, Trinity Health announced that all cardiopulmonary department employees were required to provide updated copies of their
basic life support (“BLS”) certifications by November 26, 2010.28 A BLS certification renewal “required taking a written examination and performing a
physical demonstration of CPR.”29 On November 30, 2010, Kowitz informed
Reinertson that she would be unable to perform a physical demonstration of
CPR until cleared to do so by her physician.30
On December 2, 2010, Kowitz called Reinertson to inform him that her
physician instructed she complete, at minimum, four months of physical therapy before she could complete the physical portion of the BLS examination.31
The next day, Kowitz was terminated for not being able to perform BLS.32

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012).
Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 744.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Kowitz’s Return to Work Form stated that “up until November 29, 2010,
Kowitz would be restricted to working eight-hour shifts, and lifting, carrying, pulling,
or pushing no more than ten pounds, among other restrictions.”).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (Reinertson posted a memorandum that stated, “If you are not up to date
on your BLS you will need to submit a letter indicating why you are not up to date and
the date you are scheduled to take the BLS class.”).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 744–45 (Kowitz submitted a letter to Reinertson informing him that she
would not be able to do the physical part of BLS until she had clearance from her doctor.).
31. Id. at 745.
32. Id.
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Kowitz subsequently brought suit against Trinity Health, Reinertson, and Waldera under the ADA33 and the North Dakota Human Rights Act34 (“NDHRA”),
alleging that they discriminated against her when they terminated her employment and failed to accommodate her disability.35
Kowitz asserted that Trinity failed to accommodate her because Trinity
should have allowed her additional time to complete her BLS certification or
reassigned her to another position that did not require the certification.36 Trinity argued that “Kowitz was not a qualified individual under the ADA, because
performing BLS was an essential function of both of her positions.”37 Furthermore, Trinity contended that Kowitz never requested an accommodation.38
The district court agreed with Trinity and granted summary judgment,
holding that Kowitz was not qualified to perform the essential functions of either of her positions.39 In addition, the district court concluded that because
Kowitz produced no evidence that she ever requested an accommodation for
her inability to perform BLS, Trinity was under no obligation to allow her additional time to complete her BLS certification or to reassign her to another
position that did not require the certification.40 Kowitz appealed to the Eighth
Circuit.41
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and held that: (1) BLS certification was an essential function of Kowitz’s
positions and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Kowitz
requested an accommodation.42 The court noted that although Kowitz did not
explicitly request an accommodation, she did notify her supervisors that she
would not be able to obtain certification until completing physical therapy and
Trinity was aware of her disability and her general limitations.43 The Eighth
Circuit concluded that where an employee provides enough information that
under the circumstances the employer can fairly be said to know of the disability and desire for an accommodation, a genuine issue of material fact exists as
to whether that employee requested an accommodation sufficient to trigger the
employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process of identifying a reasonable
accommodation.44

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03.1 (West 2018).
Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 745.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 746, 748.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 748.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The ADA is “among the most wide-ranging civil rights statutes that were
passed in the 20th century.”45 Not only does the ADA prohibit discrimination
based on disability, but it mandates affirmative duties for employers to make
necessary changes in operations so that disabled individuals enjoy the same
rights as others.46 Kowitz v. Trinity Health deals with this unique concept of
the ADA. To gain a better understanding of the legal background of Kowitz,
Section A of this Part provides an overview of the ADA and the reasonable
accommodation requirement, Section B explores the legislative history and
EEOC guidance regarding the reasonable accommodation and interactive process concepts, and Section C examines Eighth Circuit case law.

A. Overview of the ADA and Reasonable Accommodation
Requirement
Nearly a quarter-century after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,47
Congress began discussing the possible extension of civil rights protection to
individuals with disabilities.48 ADA legislation swiftly passed both the House
and Senate, and it was signed into law by President George H.W. Bush on July
26, 1990.49 The ADA’s stated purpose is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities.”50
The statute notes that, due to the lack of antidiscrimination laws, people
with disabilities have been precluded from being able to fully thrive in the
workplace and beyond because of discrimination.51 Title I of the ADA specifically prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals with disabilities.52 Employers with more than fifteen employees are subject to Title I
45. PETER A. SUSSER, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AND THE WORKPLACE 2

(2005).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
SUSSER, supra note 45, at 7.
Id. at 12.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012).
Id. § 12101.
See id. § 12112 (2012).
The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual –

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
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requirements.53 In general, employers may not discriminate against an individual on the basis of disability in regards to “job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”54 The
elements a plaintiff must show to prevail on a claim under Title I of the ADA
are: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the statute; (2) she is qualified to
perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action due to her disability.55
Furthermore, Title I requires employers to make reasonable accommodations to disabled individuals that need assistance to successfully perform their
jobs.56 The nature of the reasonable accommodation obligation is as follows:
employers are obligated to provide reasonable accommodations that allow otherwise qualified individuals to perform the essential functions of their jobs so
long as such accommodation does not create an “undue hardship”57 for the employer.58 That obligation extends to all aspects of employment, such as hiring,
discharge, and advancement.59 The reasonable accommodation requirement is
arguably the most unique concept of the ADA.60 While other federal antidiscrimination statutes focus on equal treatment of individuals based on race, sex,
and age,61 the ADA goes further by placing an affirmative duty on employers
to identify and provide reasonable accommodations to individuals with disabilities.62 Although employers are obligated to reasonably accommodate religious beliefs and practices as required by the Civil Rights Act of 1964,63 the
ADA creates requirements that are far more reaching.64
Because employers are only obligated to accommodate a “qualified individual with a disability,”65 the first inquiry is whether the individual-employee
is “qualified.” Under the ADA, for a person to be a qualified individual, she
Id. § 12102 (2012).
53. Id. § 12111(5)(A).
54. Id. § 12112(a).
55. Wenzel v. Mo.-Am. Water Co., 404 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2005).
56. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
57. The term “undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense, when considered in light of the facts set forth in subparagraph (B). Id. §
12111(10)(A).
58. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); id. § 12111(8).
59. Id. § 12112(a).
60. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 2, 12, 21.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (Except
for religion, employers not required to accommodate protected individuals under Title
VII or the ADEA.).
62. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 2.
63. § 2000e(j).
64. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 21 (“[T]he ADA impose[s] an affirmative duty on
employers to provide special and unique treatment to disabled individuals.”).
65. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
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must (1) possess the requisite skill, education, and other job-related requirements for the position and (2) be able to perform the essential functions of the
position desired or held, with or without reasonable accommodation.66 Essential functions are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the
individual with a disability holds or desires.”67
The determination of whether a function is essential requires consideration of: (1) “‘whether the employer actually requires employees in the position
to perform the functions that the employer asserts are essential’” and (2)
“‘whether removing the function would fundamentally alter that position.’”68
The inquiry is fact-specific and requires evaluating several factors, such as how
much time the employee spends performing the function, the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, and written job descriptions prepared
before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job.69 If an employee is
unable to perform an essential job function, then she is not a “qualified individual” and is therefore disqualified from ADA protection.70
Furthermore, the ADA only requires an employer to make accommodations for known limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.71 Therefore, an employee must notify his or her employer that he or she
needs or desires an accommodation.72 After an employee requests a need for
an accommodation, the ADA requires the employer to:
initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the
precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable
accommodations that could overcome those limitations. 73

The regulations allude to employers having an obligation to engage in an “interactive process”; however, it is unclear what this interactive process should
look like. Courts have relied on the legislative histories of the ADA and EEOC
regulations for guidance.74

66. Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 2016); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(m) (2017).
67. § 1630.2(n)(1).
68. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 778–79 (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. 1630 (2003)).
69. § 1630.2(n).
70. See § 12112(b)(5)(A).
71. See id.
72. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 23.
73. § 1630.2(o)(3).
74. The EEOC “is responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to
discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color,
religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national
origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.” Overview, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ (last visited May 30,
2018).
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B. Legislative History and EEOC Regulations Regarding the
Interactive Process
The legislative history of the ADA reveals that Congress intended employers and employees to engage in the interactive process in which possible
accommodations are identified to provide an equal opportunity for an individual with a disability.75 Congress specified that this process is triggered only
after the employee requests an accommodation, given that “people with disabilities may have a lifetime of experience identifying ways to accomplish tasks
differently in many different circumstances” and, therefore, “will know exactly
what accommodation.”76 Congress indicated that there are times when neither
the employer nor employee knows what the appropriate accommodation is because the employer is not familiar enough with the individual’s disability and
the employee is not familiar enough with the job in question.77 Therefore, the
employer should initiate an informal, four-step interactive process to identify
and provide an appropriate accommodation.78
The first step requires an employer to “identify barriers to equal opportunity.”79 This step may include identifying and distinguishing between essential and nonessential tasks of the relevant position and consulting with the employee to identify the abilities and limitations of the individual.80 The second
step is to search for and evaluate potential accommodations.81 The employer
may have to consult with the disabled employee.82 After identifying possible
accommodations, the third step is to determine the reasonableness of such accommodations.83 Factors to consider when determining the reasonableness of
potential accommodations include effectiveness, reliability, and timeliness.84
The fourth and final step is to provide the accommodation that is “most appropriate for the employee and the employer and that does not impose an undue
hardship on the employer’s operation or to permit the employee to provide his
or her own accommodation if it does impose an undue hardship.”85
The EEOC Appendix to the ADA provides guidance regarding the process of determining an appropriately reasonable accommodation, consistent
with legislative intent. The Appendix states that “it may be necessary for the
employer to initiate a more defined problem solving process, such as the step75. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 65 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,

348.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 65–66.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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by-step process described above, as part of its reasonable effort to identify the
appropriate reasonable accommodation.”86 The EEOC suggests a four-step
problem-solving approach, like the one suggested in the House report. When
an employee requests an accommodation, an employer should:
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose
and essential functions;
(2) Consult with the individual with a disability to ascertain the precise job-related limitations imposed by the individual’s disability and
how those limitations could be overcome with a reasonable accommodation;
(3) In consultation with the individual to be accommodated, identify
potential accommodations and assess the effectiveness each would have
in enabling the individual to perform the essential functions of the position; and
(4) Consider the preference of the individual to be accommodated
and select and implement the accommodation that is most appropriate
for both the employee and the employer. 87

Unlike the House report, the EEOC does not indicate whether employers are
always required to engage in the interactive process, as the EEOC suggests “it
may be necessary for the employer.”88 Furthermore, if employers are required
to participate in the interactive process, the employer’s liability for failure to
participate remains uncertain.

C. Eighth Circuit Case Law
1. Prima Facie Case of Failure to Participate in Interactive Process
After the EEOC released its interpretive guidelines, it was still unclear
whether employers were required to engage in the interactive process.89 Most
courts have indicated that employers are required to engage in the interactive
process with qualified individuals,90 while some courts have held there is no
86.
87.
88.
89.

29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2017).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2017) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (“[T]he
employer must make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation.”
(emphasis added)).
90. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Memorial Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir.
2001); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 312 (3rd Cir. 1999); Taylor v.
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per se liability under the ADA if an employer fails to engage in the interactive
process.91 The Eighth Circuit took a middle-ground approach in Fjellestad v.
Pizza Hut of America, Inc.92 In this case, the Eighth Circuit agreed with other
circuits that held there is no per se liability if an employer fails to engage in the
interactive process;93 however, for summary judgment purposes, “the failure
of an employer to engage in an interactive process to determine whether reasonable accommodations are possible is prima facie evidence that the employer
may be acting in bad faith.”94
The Eighth Circuit ruled that an employer will not be held liable if no
reasonable accommodation is possible but “a factual question exists as to
whether the employer has attempted to provide reasonable accommodation as
required by the ADA.”95 The Eighth Circuit followed the Third Circuit’s analysis illustrated in Taylor v. Phoenixville School District.96 Once an employee
requests an accommodation, the employer’s duty to engage in the interactive
process is triggered.97 An employee arguing her employer failed to participate
in the interactive process must demonstrate the following:
1) the employer knew about the employee’s disability; 2) the employee
requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disability; 3) the
employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee in
seeking accommodations; and 4) the employee could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith. 98

2. Request for Accommodation
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that the employee is responsible
for requesting an accommodation before the employer is required to provide
accommodation or engage in the interactive process.99 While it is clear that the
Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “the responsibility for fashioning a reasonable accommodation is shared between the employee and
employer”).
91. See, e.g., Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir.
1996); Taylor, 93 F.3d at 165.
92. See Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999).
93. Id. at 952.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 165 (3d Cir.),
vacated, 184 F.3d 296 (1999)).
99. See id. (“The guidelines set forth the predicate requirement that when the disabled individual requests accommodation, it becomes necessary to initiate the interactive process.”); EEOC. v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 491 F.3d 790, 795
(8th Cir. 2007) (“A disabled employee must initiate the accommodation-seeking process by making his employer aware of the need for an accommodation.”); Wallin v.
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employee is responsible for requesting an accommodation,100 it is unclear as to
what information the employer must have before its duty to engage in the interactive process is triggered.
In Fjellestad, the Eighth Circuit stated that “notice must merely make it
clear to the employer that the employee wants assistance for his or her disability.”101 However, the same year the Eighth Circuit decided Fjellestad, the court
also decided Mole v. Buckhorn, where it held that a general request for accommodation was insufficient, as “only [the employee] could accurately identify
the need for accommodations specific to her job and workplace.”102 Furthermore, employees “cannot expect the employer to read [her] mind and know
[she] secretly wanted a particular accommodation and [then] sue the employer
for not providing it.”103
In some cases, the Eighth Circuit has analyzed the sufficiency of the employer’s knowledge based on the “totality of the knowledge” the employer had
at hand.104 The “totality of knowledge” approach examines not only what the
employee stated at the time he or she requested an accommodation but also
what the employer already knew about the employee.105 In Cannice v. Norwest
Bank Iowa, the Eighth Circuit considered what prior communications the employee had with his employer and other instances in which the employer was
aware of the employee’s disability and need for an accommodation.106 On the
contrary, in EEOC v. Product Fabricators, the Eighth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim because the plaintiff failed to show

Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 689 (8th Cir. 1998) (“In general, it is the responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform the employer that an accommodation is needed.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9
(1992))); Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1999) (“In
order to be entitled to an accommodation, the employee must inform the employer that
an accommodation is needed.”).
100. Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d 957, 961–62 (quoting Taylor, 174 F.3d at 159).
The EEOC’s manual makes clear . . . that while the notice does not have to be
in writing, be made by the employee, or formally invoke the magic words ‘reasonable accommodation,’ the notice nonetheless must make clear that the employee wants assistance for his or her disability.

Id. (quoting Taylor, 174 F.3d at 158–59).
101. Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952 n.5. Plaintiff clearly requested: “I request that I be
reasonably accommodated.” Id. at 952.
102. Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1999).
103. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ferry
v. Roosevelt Bank, 883 F. Supp. 435, 441 (E.D. Mo. 1995)).
104. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 118.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 119; see also Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 727
(8th Cir. 1999).
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that he specifically requested an accommodation.107 Like in Cannice, the employer was already aware the employee had a disability because the employee
had received workers’ compensation for injury and disability, and the employee had notified his supervisor that his shoulder “was causing him pain”
and he might have to take off for surgery.108 But the Eighth Circuit came out
with the opposite holding. Based on the circuit’s precedent, there is no uniform
rule regarding what information an employer must have before its obligation
to engage in the interactive process is triggered.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for
further proceeding. Judge Jane Kelly, writing for the majority, reasoned that
Kowitz provided enough information to show that under the circumstances
Trinity knew of the disability and desire for an accommodation.109 The district
court concluded that (1) Kowitz was not qualified to perform the essential functions of her job, and (2) Trinity Health had no duty to reassign Kowitz to an
alternative position.110 Kowitz appealed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Trinity Health.111

1. Essential Function
The Eighth Circuit held that there was no genuine issue of material fact
as to whether BLS certification was an essential function of Kowitz’s position
based on the following: Kowitz’s job description for lead technician stated that
BLS certification is required, testimony stating that respiratory therapists were
expected to perform BLS, and every respiratory therapist except for Kowitz
was certified by the November 26, 2010 deadline.112 After determining BLS
certification was an essential function of Kowitz’s position, the Eighth Circuit
discussed the main issue of the case – whether Kowitz could perform this essential job function with an accommodation and, if so, whether Trinity failed
to reasonably accommodate her.113

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

EEOC v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d 963, 967–68, 971 (8th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 968.
Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 745.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 745–46.
Id. at 746.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss2/8

12

Kim: Help Me, Help You: Eighth Circuit Diminishes Notice Requirement f

2018]

HELP ME, HELP YOU

421

2. Request for a Reasonable Accommodation
The majority found that there was sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment as to whether Kowitz requested a reasonable accommodation.114 Kowitz told her supervisor in writing that she was unable to fulfill the
physical portion of the BLS examination.115 In addition, Kowitz called her
supervisor and left a voicemail informing him that she had to complete at least
four months of physical therapy before she could obtain the certification.116
Furthermore, the court determined there were other facts that revealed that
Trinity should have understood Kowitz’s communications to be a request for a
reasonable accommodation.117
According to the court, her notification to her supervisor stating that she
would have to complete physical therapy “implied that an accommodation
would be required until then.”118 The court noted that other cases where the
Eighth Circuit held an employer’s duty to accommodate an employee is not
triggered until the employee clearly requests an accommodation were much
more “ambiguous.”119
The Eighth Circuit stated that Kowitz was only required to “provide[] the
employer with enough information that, under the circumstances, the employer
can be fairly said to know of both the disability and desire for an accommodation.”120 This includes the “employer’s knowledge of the disability and the
employee’s prior communications about the disability, and is not limited to the
precise words spoken by the employee at the time of the request.”121
According to the majority, because Kowitz made Trinity Health aware
that she could not perform BLS until she completed physical therapy and Trinity Health was already aware of her disability and the general nature of her
limitations, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Kowitz requested an accommodation sufficient to trigger Trinity Health’s duty to engage
in the interactive process of identifying a reasonable accommodation.

B. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Steven M. Colloton stated he would affirm the judgment of the district court.122 Judge Colloton contended that the
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 747.
Id.
Id.
Id. (discussing that Trinity should have been aware of Kowitz’s need for accommodation based on her prior FMLA leave, the information in her Return to Work
Form, and comments to her supervisor indicating she was still experiencing neck pain).
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 748 (alteration in original) (quoting Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d 957, 962
(8th Cir. 2002)).
121. Id.
122. Id. (Colloton, J., dissenting).
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majority’s decision “conflates the employer’s knowledge of an employee’s disability with the requirement that an employee must make a clear request for
accommodation.”123
Judge Colloton argued that Kowitz’s claim for failure to accommodate
fails because she did not clearly request an accommodation.124 She merely
notified Trinity that she could not complete the physical portion of the BLS
examination until she completed at least four months of physical therapy.125
While such a notification “can be said in some sense to have made her employer ‘aware of the need for an accommodation,’” the court has never held
that “notifying the employer of a disability is an ‘implied’ request . . . sufficient
to trigger an employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process,” according
to Judge Colloton.126
Judge Colloton pointed out that the law requires employees to clearly notify their employers that they desire an accommodation.127 By eliminating the
predicate requirement to initiate the interactive process, Judge Colloton asserted the majority decision creates great uncertainty for employers and employees.128 Judge Colloton concluded that because Kowitz never clearly requested an accommodation, there was no genuine issue of fact concerning
whether Kowitz requested an accommodation.129

V. COMMENT
The Eighth Circuit’s holding diminishes what the court has commonly
called the “predicate requirement,” or the requirement that employees clearly
notify their employers that they desire accommodation. Rather than considering whether Kowitz requested an accommodation, the court examined the “totality of knowledge” Trinity had on hand.130 Because the “totality of
knowledge” approach creates great uncertainty and is not in the best interest of
both employers and employees, this Note argues that when deciding whether
an employer failed to engage in the interactive process, courts should examine
whether the employee clearly requested a need for an accommodation, rather
than analyzing the totality of knowledge the employer had on hand. Section A
of this Part explains why this rule is illogical and analyzes the burdens this rule
will have on employers and employees. Given the current ambiguity of the
law, Section B of this Part provides guidance to employers moving forward.
123. Id. at 750.
124. Id. at 749 (To prove an employer failed to make a reasonable accommodation,

an employee must show “(1) that the employer knew about her disability, and (2) that
she requested an accommodation or assistance for her disability.”).
125. Id. at 748–49.
126. Id. at 750.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 748.
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Specifically, Section B reviews Trinity’s mistakes so employers can avoid falling into similar pitfalls in the future.

A. Employees Should Clearly Request a Need for an Accommodation
An employee should not be allowed to prevail on an accommodation
claim where an employee only notified his or her employer of the disability
because it does not give the employer proper notice of a need for an accommodation. The totality of knowledge approach taken by the Eighth Circuit “conflates the employer’s knowledge of an employee’s disability with the requirement that an employee must make a clear request for accommodation.”131 Employers will be uncertain when their obligation to engage in the interactive process is triggered, as any knowledge of disability may trigger that obligation.132
This is problematic because any employee who notifies his or her employer
that he or she cannot work because of a disability can be said to have made the
employer “aware of the need for an accommodation.”133 Furthermore, as noted
above, the ADA is unique compared to other federal antidiscrimination statutes
because it not only focuses on equal treatment of individuals with protected
characteristics but also places an affirmative duty on employers to identify and
provide reasonable accommodations. Further obligating employers to assume
when an accommodation is needed is an enormous and unreasonable burden.
On the other hand, it is not overly burdensome to require employees seeking an accommodation to clearly request such accommodation because employees with disabilities possess the most information regarding their disabilities and limitations. Kowitz alleged that she desired to be moved to a different
position but she never made this request known.134 There was no way for Trinity to know that Kowitz desired to be transferred, yet the Eighth Circuit held
that a reasonable jury could find that Trinity understood Kowitz’s communications to be a request for accommodation, thus triggering Trinity’s duty to engage in the interactive process.135
When enacting the ADA, Congress noted that, compared to employers,
employees are in a better position to request accommodations because individuals with disabilities usually have a “lifetime of experience identifying ways to
accomplish tasks differently in many different circumstances.”136 Although an
employee is not required to request any specific accommodation, he or she will
typically know “exactly what accommodation he or she will need to perform

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 750.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 749–50; Brief of Appellees Trinity Health, Doughlas Reinerston, &
Mark Waldera at 21–22, Kowitz, 839 F.3d 742 (No. 15-1584).
135. See Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 747.
136. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 65–66 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 348.
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successfully in a particular job.”137 Congress further noted that the employee’s
suggested accommodation is often simpler and less expensive than any accommodation the employer may have devised.138
It would not have been an onerous burden on Kowitz to require her to
clearly request her desired accommodation. Consistent with legislative findings, Kowitz was in the best position to disclose that she desired an accommodation, and in this case, she was in the best position to disclose exactly what
accommodation she desired. An employee who already knows that he or she
desires a specific accommodation should not wait for his or her employer to
identify the accommodation. The majority’s holding seems to be at odds with
the concerns raised in Mole – an employee cannot “expect the employer to read
[her] mind and know [she] secretly wanted a particular accommodation and
[then] sue the employer for not providing it.”139
An employer’s duty to identify an accommodation should not be triggered
until an employee has clearly requested a need for accommodation, but there
are some policy arguments for why the full burden should not be placed on the
employee. One argument against placing the full burden on employees to disclose is that employers are likely to be “repeat players”;140 therefore, it would
not be burdensome to expect employers to identify when an employee needs
an accommodation. While employers are typically familiar with the ADA and
accommodation process, expecting employers to assume when an accommodation is needed is still burdensome. The ADA specifically contends that it is
inappropriate for employers to provide accommodation in the absence of request.141 It would be inconsistent with that prohibition to require employers to
“anticipate all the problems that a disability may create on the job and spontaneously accommodate them.”142
This Note does not claim that it would have been wrong for Trinity to
begin identifying accommodation possibilities for Kowitz, rather an employer’s duty to identify an accommodation should not be triggered until the
employee has clearly requested a need for an accommodation. As the dissenting opinion indicated, it is inappropriate to “impose a rule based on how a be-

137. Id. at 66.
138. Id.
139. Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1999)

(alterations in original) (quoting Ferry v. Roosevelt Bank, 883 F. Supp. 435, 441 (E.D.
Mo. 1995)).
140. The term “repeat players” is typically used in an employment arbitration context. But in this case, employers would be considered “repeat players” because most
employers are familiar with complying with the ADA.
141. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 785–86.
142. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 119 (quoting Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel, Inc., 178
F.3d 731, 736 (5th Cir. 1999)).
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neficent employer would treat an employee who notifies the employer of a disability, even if some employers might well take it upon themselves to initiate
the interactive process without a request from the employee.”143
A second reason against placing the full burden on employees is that even
if employees are in the better position to disclose, some employees – specifically individuals with mental disabilities – may be hesitant or unable to disclose. While a valid concern, Congress addressed the problem. The general
rule is that employers should not make disability-related inquires as to whether
an employee requires a reasonable accommodation.144 However, an exception
to this rule is made when the employer: (1) knows that the employee has a
disability; (2) knows, or has reason to know, that the employee is experiencing
workplace problems because of the disability; and (3) knows, or has reason to
know, that the disability prevents the employee from requesting an accommodation.145 If the preceding elements are met, the employer should initiate the
interactive process without being asked by the employee.146 Because the law
addresses the concern regarding individuals unable to disclose, employees
should clearly request a need for an accommodation before the employer’s duty
to engage in the interactive process is triggered.
Requiring employees to unequivocally request accommodations to trigger the interactive process does not eliminate employers’ affirmative duty to
identify and provide accommodations, nor does it in any way nullify the interactive process. Employers always hold the duty to initiate the interactive process. Employees should be the ones to put employers on notice as employees
are in the best position to disclose. The more clearly an employee communicates his or her request, the more likely employers are to recognize the employee’s need or desire for an ADA accommodation. The nature of the interactive process is a “help me, help you” process. Employers can better “help”
employees with disabilities when employees clearly request accommodations.

B. Guidance for Employers
Kowitz provides important lessons to employers regarding their responsibilities to identify and provide accommodations. First, employers should be
cautious if they already know of an employee’s disability due to the employee
taking FMLA leave. Second, timing of the employer’s knowledge of the em-

143. Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2016) (Colloton, J., dissenting).
144. SUSSER, supra note 45, at 790.
145. Id.
146. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT (2002).
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ployee’s disability and request for accommodation is critical. Trinity was already aware of Kowitz’s disability, as she had previously taken FMLA leave
and provided information of her limitations in her Return to Work form.147
The first lesson of Kowitz is that employers should be cautious if they
have knowledge of an employee’s disability due to the employee taking FMLA
leave. The EEOC has provided guidance stating that if an employee requests
leave for a reason related or possibility related to a disability, the employer
should consider both a request for FMLA and ADA accommodation.148 Employers should analyze employees’ rights under each statute separately when
determining the appropriate action to take.149 The EEOC further provides that
employers should be “sensitive that apparently routine conversations might
trigger the ADA’s duty to accommodate, especially if the employer already has
information concerning the employee’s medical conditions from records provided to it pursuant to . . . the FMLA, or otherwise.”150
The importance of this guidance is illustrated in Kowitz – although Kowitz had exhausted her FMLA leave, Trinity still had a duty under the ADA to
provide her with a reasonable accommodation.151 Trinity was too quick to terminate Kowitz and had failed to determine her rights under the ADA. Moving
forward, employers should be cautious when employees request leave or have
already requested leave and should carefully analyze employees’ rights under
each statute separately.
The second lesson of Kowitz is that the timing of the employer’s
knowledge of the employee’s disability and request for accommodation is critical. Perhaps the most damaging fact for Trinity was that it terminated Kowitz
only one day after receiving her voicemail stating that she needed to complete
more physical therapy before she could obtain BLS certification.152 Although
147. Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 747.
148. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 119.
149. Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship

Under the American with Disabilities Act, EEOC (Oct.
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html [hereinafter
Guidance].
150. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 119.
151. Enforcement Guidance, supra note 148. See Example A:

17, 2002),
Enforcement

An employee with an ADA disability needs 13 weeks of leave for treatment
related to the disability. The employee is eligible under the FMLA for 12 weeks
of leave (the maximum available), so this period of leave constitutes both
FMLA leave and a reasonable accommodation. Under the FMLA, the employer
could deny the employee the thirteenth week of leave. But, because the employee is also covered under the ADA, the employer cannot deny the request
for the thirteenth week of leave unless it can show undue hardship. The employer may consider the impact on its operations caused by the initial 12-week
absence, along with other undue hardship factors.

Id.
152. Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 745.
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the Eighth Circuit has rejected situations where the employee’s requests for
accommodation occur after adverse action was already taken,153 the Eighth Circuit has found that an ADA violation exists if the employee notifies his or her
employer of the need for accommodation and the employer subsequently takes
adverse action – such as discharge or discipline – that an accommodation might
have prevented.154
Employers considering terminating, disciplining, or taking any adverse
action against an employee after that employee has requested an accommodation or has been made aware of the employee’s disability should not act adversely without consulting with a human resource representative or an attorney.
Furthermore, employers should learn from the mistake of Trinity and not wait
for employees to make specific requests for accommodation. Employers
should engage in good faith communication about whether there is an accommodation possible that would enable the employee to continue doing his or her
job.

VI. CONCLUSION
The ultimate consequence of an employer failing to engage in the interactive process is that the employer may fail to discover an appropriate accommodation for the employee’s disability. The Eighth Circuit’s holding seems
“employee friendly” as it gives employee-plaintiffs legal leverage in failureto-accommodate claims.155 The holding, however, does not necessarily make
it more likely that employers will engage in the interactive process. By reducing employees’ obligation to communicate their accommodation needs, it is
less likely that employers will recognize employees’ needs for accommodation.
The lack of clarity in the law could negatively impact employees with
disabilities in the long run. As Judge Colloton stated, “Employers and employees rely on predictability to make efficient decisions and to avoid costly and
burdensome litigation.”156 For now, employers should be cautious if they already know of an employee’s disability or the general nature of an employee’s
limitations and should not wait for an employee to specifically request an accommodation before engaging in the interactive process.

153. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 119.
154. Id. (citing Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 1999)).
155. Because rather than having to prove he or she requested an accommodation,

an employee only must show that he or she provided “enough information that, under
the circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of both the disability and
desire for an accommodation.” Kowitz, 839 F.3d at 748 (quoting Ballard v. Rubin, 284
F.3d 957, 962 (8th Cir. 2002)).
156. Id. at 750 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
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